Energy and politics are two mutually interconnected activities at the world and continental levels as well as in most contemporary states. Close interrelationship between the two is particularly strong in industrially developed states and in energy exporters important for the world economy. The interaction works in both directions and could be analyzed from several viewpoints: geostrategic, economic, legal, technical, ecological etc. Energy strongly influences everyday life of every state and their economic development, markedly conditions the relations among main actors on the political scene and strongly influences domestic and foreign policies in energy exporters and in energy transit countries. On the other hand energy frequently stimulates social and political pathology clientalism, blatant abuse of power, the negative role of lobbies, corruption etc. which all often badly influence state policies in the energy field. The control over energy income is one of the sources of and often the most important source of social and political power. Consequently it frequently causes political conflicts and in some states also domestic repression and armed violence. Domestic politics strongly and often decisively influence energy policies – through adopting legislation, issuing permits, granting concessions, establishing or abolishing monopolies or oligopolies, with changes in foreign trade, taxation and customs regulations, with introducing and enforcing embargoes on trade with energy, with direct personnel appointments in state energy companies and holdings. Energy considerations are important also in foreign policies of many states, particularly of great powers and energy exporters. The geopolitical aspects of energy become particularly visible during international crises and local wars. A two-way interaction is present also in the activities of international organizations. Our public often is not aware of the frequently veiled interaction between energy and politics which could and often has positive or negative consequences for the society.
F.30 Professional assessment of the situation
COBISS.SI-ID: 31339869Purpose – An analysis of the security implications of asymmetric warfare and counterinsurgency. Methodology/approach – This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature based on historical, defense-strategic and also a wider securitypolitical qualitative approach. Findings – The results show that the military is not always the best and the only instrument to counter asymmetric war. Intelligence and covert action play a certain role, but cause additional problems, also with regard to international law. Research limitations/implications – Further research should be done with regard to a coordination and cooperation of the various actors and bodies engaged in countering insurgency and asymmetric warfare.
B.03 Paper at an international scientific conference
COBISS.SI-ID: 31827805The territory of the Republic of Slovenia has been historically considered of great geostrategic importance, especially due to conspicuous interests of great powers throughout the whole history. Direct claims for the ownership of this area can be traced down to the Roman Empire, the Republic of Venice, the Austrian Empire, Napoleon’s Empire ant than later in 19th and 20th Century, to various territorial interests of Italy, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Serbia and the Soviet Union. The main reason was and still is that Slovenian territory represents the only strategic land gateway south of the Alps in the direction from east to west and vice versa. Moreover, this route has to be considered as the shortest way of access to the Adriatic Sea for continental states of central Europe. From a military point of view, in most of strategic concepts this territory was seen as a breakthrough corridor not just in the above mentioned direction but also as a starting point of access for the entire south-eastern Europe. The geostrategic importance of the territory arises and becomes highly important especially in cases of open confrontation between regions or states. Exactly what happened during the time of the Cold War – SFR Yugoslavia became a geostrategic nerve knot between Eastern and Western Block. This fact had extremely important consequences especially for the Yugoslav military strategic planning. Because of Cold War tensions in Europe the Yugoslav political elite decided to break away from the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army as the only military power in the state and to create the Territorial Defense, in order to strengthen national defense. The defense system, known as the Total National Defense, together with the social self-protection engaged nearly 5% of the whole population, in addition to the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army. This decision gave the republics of Yugoslavia the possibility to organize defense systems of their own under the framework of federal government. At that time nobody could predict that war would break up between the two parts of Yugoslav defense system, let alone that Territorial defense would defeat the, by all means and aspects superior, Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.
B.04 Guest lecture
COBISS.SI-ID: 31049053The majority of social processes have become very dependent on information andcommunication technologies (ICT) according to their quick development and increasing use. With the emergence of new technologies and growing dependence of society on ICT, threats have emerged, which experts described as new. Information security or cyber dimension of national security has thus become an increasing priority for the countries, but they face these new threats differently. This article contains a specialized in-depth analysis of the situation of ICT in Estonia, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The selection of the countries was based on their ICT development, experience withinformation threats and membership in various political and security organizations. We examined the following indicators: the incidence of threats,normative (legal) acts and actors who are responsible for assuring information security. These indicators subsequently allowed us a detailed understanding of ICT threats faced by selected countries and their responses to them.
F.17 Transfer of existing technologies, know-how, methods and procedures into practice
COBISS.SI-ID: 31001181Complex emergencies require participation of a great number of institutions that are directly or indirectly responsible for emergency management at the local, national and international level. The concept of integrated emergency management presupposes a strong operational and communication coordination. Moreover, an attempt to coordinate or even centralise communication in nuclear or radiological emergencies is recognised in many national, as well in international documents. However, past experiences show that in radiological emergencies there are always many voices explaining, commenting, giving opinions and, finally, influencing the perception and response of the population. This paper shows that achieving a globally coordinated approach in communicating with many publics about a single local nuclear and radiological emergency likely remains only wishful thinking for emergency communication planners. The Fukushima nuclear accident is in presented research taken as a case study and the method employed is media content and discourse analysis of the Belgian, Italian and Slovenian quality newspapers (N=720 articles).
B.03 Paper at an international scientific conference
COBISS.SI-ID: 31824477