The author examines possible interactions between human brain research and criminal law. He starts with the presumption that the perpetrator's psychological reflection of his or her act, which has been deemed essential by the psychological theories of culpability, is in reality often not present or is - at least at the time being - not accessible to the judicial ascertainment. Therefore, strivings sprang up in the criminal legal doctrine to "normativize and objectivize" the forms of culpability (the author's main emphasis goes to shifts in the understanding of the intent of third degree - dolus eventualis). The basic idea is that the forms of culpability have to be seen as value judgments in the judge's head instead of psychological entities in the perpetrator's head. The repercussions of this conceptual shift are discussed through selected case law, whereas the author points up potential dangers, intrinsically linked to this way of thinking. The author concludes that normativization of forms of culpability is to certain extent unavoidable, yet he pleads for refinement of criteria, on which such value judgments shall be based.
B.06 Other
COBISS.SI-ID: 12762705Neurolaw is a new interdisciplinary research field that examines various aspects of the law through the perspective of neuroscience. The article describes some experiments in the field of neurolaw and introduces a modern model of how the human brain works, and introduces a distinction between brainautopilot and his supervisor. Both of these functions we attribute to specific structures in the brain. At the end we present some suggestions on how the findings of neurolaw can be used in practice.
B.06 Other
COBISS.SI-ID: 1588558